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Corporate financialisation in South Africa: From investment strike to housing 
bubble 
 
Abstract: This article reveals the processes of financialisation in the South African 
economy by tracing the sources and destinations of non-financial corporations’ (NFCs) 
liquidity. The paper argues that rather than the volume of NFCs’ financial investment, the 
composition of financial assets is crucial to assess corporate financialisation in the 
country. Non-financial businesses in South Africa fundamentally transformed their 
investment behaviour during the 1990s, shifting from more productive uses such as trade 
credit towards highly liquid and potentially innovative (and therefore risky) financial 
investment. Following the direction of financial flows the article shows that companies’ 
financial operations – fuelled by foreign capital inflows – are linked to the price inflation in 
South African property markets. 
Introduction 
Financialisation reflected by the increasing influence of finance (Epstein, 2005), 
has been identified as problematic in rich countries and increasingly so in emerging 
economies (Demir, 2007; Becker et al., 2010; Powell, 2013; Karwowski & Stockhammer, 
2017). The phenomenon has been linked to subdued investment rates, speculation and 
heightened financial instability, as well as rising inequality. However, the processes by 
which financialisation brings about these socio-economic malaises often remain in the 
dark. When the concept is used as a catch-all for the failings of contemporary capitalism 
it becomes analytically vacuous (Christophers, 2015). Therefore, it is vital to reveal the 
processes behind financialisation phenomena. Accordingly, this article identifies the link 
between financialisation of non-financial companies (NFCs) and residential house price 
inflation in South Africa. It argues that the heightened liquidity preference of South African 
NFCs has contributed to the rapid growth of house prices in the country by facilitating 
commercial banks’ credit extension. The present analysis is able to reveal, for the first 
time, the link between corporate financialisation and house price inflation, and by 
extension the dynamics that increase financial fragility in the country more broadly. 
Addressing a certain complacency amongst mainstream economics and policymakers in 
South Africa, the paper argues that it is not the size of NFCs’ financial investment that 
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accounts for corporate financialisation in the country. The volume of financial investment 
has always been high among South African NFCs. Rather financialised South African 
corporations have altered the way they invest into financial assets as well as the 
composition of their asset portfolios since the 1990s.  
The article uses flow of funds analysis, which is particularly useful for 
financialisation studies because it demonstrates the inherent interconnectedness 
between real and financial transactions. Tracing flow of funds data back to 1970 reveals 
that South African NFCs have significantly modified their financial operations since the 
1980s.1 Historically, NFCs have financed almost the entirety of their capital investment 
internally. This changed somewhat during the boom of the early 2000s. More importantly, 
since the 1990s NFCs have shifted away from providing large volumes of trade credit to 
holding liquid assets, such as cash and cash equivalents and short-term deposits, on their 
balance sheets. This is a sign of financialisation since NFCs shy away from providing 
trade credit to support productive operations and instead engage in investment in financial 
instruments.  
The majority of NFCs’ growing liquid assets is held with commercial banks in South 
Africa. In consequence, deposits of NFCs have become by far the largest liability on 
banks’ balance sheets, while loans remain the largest asset. Thus, South African banks 
still hold on to a more traditional banking model, not following their rich-country 
counterparts where actual loans account for a declining share of banks’ income while fees 
from innovative financial services are on the rise (dos Santos, 2009). Given the country’s 
status as emerging economy, policy makers perceive tight monetary policy as necessary 
and prudent. In fact, comparatively high interest rates are typical in the global South 
(McKinley & Karwowski, 2015). Tight monetary policy can fuel financialisation in emerging 
countries (see e.g. Gabor 2010a, 2010b). This paper argues that NFCs liquidity plays an 
important role in this process. Commercial banks offer relatively high interest rates, 
attracting NFCs’ deposits, which abstain from investment. While these balances do not 
remain ‘idle’ but circulate through the economy (Keeton 2018), they in fact facilitate credit 
that supports further financialisation.  
                                                 
1 For South Africa flow of funds data is only available from 1970. 
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The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section sketches the 
scope of the financialisation debate in South Africa. Two aspects of the phenomenon are 
particularly highlighted: the large and politically increasingly contentious cash holdings of 
NFCs, and the inflation of house prices. To illustrate the close link between these two 
socio-economic problems the paper proceeds to introduce a detailed flow of funds 
analysis, followed by an analysis of the loan books held by the big four South African 
banks. The final section concludes by discussing the distinct nature of financialisation in 
emerging economies.     
 
Financialisation in South Africa 
Financialisation research developed in the context of the US (Lazonick & 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Krippner, 2005) and until today mainly focuses on rich countries 
(Lapavitsas & Powell, 2013; Brown, Passarella, and Spencer, 2015; Karwowski, Shabani 
& Stockhammer, 2016). There are various literature reviews of the phenomenon in the 
context of the global North (Aalbers, 2017; van der Zwan, 2014; van Treeck, 2008). 
However, a body of literature on financialisation in the global South is only emerging 
(Becker et al., 2010; see Bonizzi, 2013, for a survey) and there are few empirical 
accounts, shedding light onto the processes behind financialisation in developing regions. 
As detrimental financialisation dynamics are likely to harm poorer societies more than rich 
ones, this dearth of in-depth empirical analysis (Pike & Pollard, 2010) constitutes an 
important gap in the literature.  
South Africa is an ideal case study to address this analytical gap since the country 
appears to ‘exemplify’ the financialised emerging economy in many respects. This section 
summarises South Africa’s financialisation experience, using a sectoral account. Since 
financialisation is a broad concept, stretching across a multitude of disciplines, adopting 
a sectoral account – which focuses on the five main macroeconomic aggregates, i.e. 
NFCs, the financial sector, households, government, and the foreign sector – 
systematises the concept from an economic perspective. 
It has been argued that financialised NFCs increasingly shift their productive 
operations and investment, which is long-term by nature, to short-term financial activity 
(Krippner, 2005; Crotty, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008). At the same time, they are also ever 
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more affected by financial markets which limit their ability to reinvest profits 
(Stockhammer, 2004) and expose NFCs to rising financial volatility (Toporowski, 2000). 
In South Africa, the activity of large company groups – the so-called mining-finance 
houses that historically focused on resource extraction and banking – has been seen as 
major driver of financialisation. During the international shunning of the apartheid regime, 
especially since the late 1970s, these mining-finance houses gained an ever-growing 
dominance over the South African economy as the country fell deeper into isolation 
(Roussow et al., 2002; Chabane et al., 2006). With the re-integration of the country’s 
economy into the global financial system since 1994, these company groups, and South 
African corporations in general, have increasingly become involved in financial 
investment at the expense of production (Ashman et al., 2011).  
Since corporate investment spending has slowed down, financial investment 
accounts for a rising share of capital stock (Ashman et al., 2013). There is evidence that 
the composition of NFCs’ financial assets has been transformed towards more short-term 
instruments (Ashman & Newman, 2012). The suspicion is that much of this financial 
investment has been speculative. Thus, according to Ashman and Fine (2013, p. 156) 
financialisation is characterised by the expansion of financial assets relative to real 
activity, crucially, ‘the absolute and relative expansion of speculative as opposed to or at 
the expense of real investment’. But few contributions have discussed corporate cash 
holdings in the light of financialisation (see Karwowski, 2015). In fact, mainstream 
economists appear to be determined to prove that corporate cash holdings in South Africa 
are not a problem (Keeton, 2018; Nyamgero, 2016) or merely the outcome of recent 
political uncertainty (Donnelley, 2017). Thus, this contribution tackles the misconception 
that large volumes of corporate liquidity is a very recent phenomenon while showing what 
role cash holdings play in corporate financialisation and the financial fragility of the South 
African economy more broadly. 
In rich countries the rapid growth of the financial sector (Philippon, 2007) and 
aggressive financial innovation have been identified as elements of financialisation 
(Lapavitsas, 2013; Lagna, 2015). These developments result in short-term growth at the 
cost of heightened levels of financial fragility (Boyer, 2000) or dampened investment and 
consequently subdued growth (Stockhammer, 2004). Some authors (Aglietta and Breton, 
2001; Lapavitsas, 2009, 2013) also argue that financialisation is accompanied by a shift 
from bank-based to market-based financial structures. Banks lose importance as credit 
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providers for NFCs, which increasingly turn towards capital markets as source of external 
finance. In South Africa the financial sector is perceived to be at the core of the country’s 
ailing economy. Since the end of apartheid the sector’s share in South African gross 
domestic product (GDP) has grown rapidly, trebling between 1994 and the 2007-8 
financial crisis (Marais, 2011). Today finance generates more than one fifth of South 
African output (SARB, 2017), which makes it the single largest contributor to GDP.2  
However, there seems to be little evidence for a significant shift towards a more market-
based system in South Africa (Teles, 2012; Karwowski & Stockhammer, 2016).  
Since the financial crisis household financialisation has attracted more attention 
from academic researchers (Langley, 2008). 3  Rising household debt burdens are a 
symptom of financialisation if growth becomes credit-driven in the face of stagnant wage 
growth and a shrinking total wage bill. The volume of household debt in South Africa is 
nowhere near US and UK levels, but nevertheless high in comparison to other emerging 
economies (Karwowski & Stockhammer, 2016). Households’ saving and borrowing 
behaviour seems to have changed very much in line with Anglo-Saxon patterns since the 
1970s. The share of saving to disposal income has gradually declined. By 2005, 
households in aggregate became net lenders rather than savers, running down their 
stocks of savings (Ashman et al., 2013). Most of the loans taken out by South African 
households are mortgages, ballooning since the mid-1990s in line with the enormous 
price inflation in residential housing (Griffith-Jones & Karwowski, 2015). Unsecured 
consumer loans have also been strongly on the rise, raising questions about their 
sustainability (Bond, 2013).   
The socio-economic impact of financialisation of state institutions and policies is a 
nascent research area, which needs more attention (Aalbers, 2017; Karwowski & 
Centurion-Vicencio, 2018). The experience of countries in the global South is distinct 
since monetary and fiscal policies are constrained by those countries’ (subordinate) 
position in global financial structures (Becker et al., 2010; Kaltenbrunner & Painceira, 
2017). Moreover, there is some evidence showing that financialisation dynamics are 
introduced (or at least exaggerated) by public policies in emerging countries for instance 
                                                 
2 The data refer to the categories provided by the South African Reserve Bank. Here finance is 
subsumed under the heading: ‘Finance and insurance, real estate and business services’. 
Business services include services that are used by the private sector, most prominently private 
security and cleaning services. 
3 This is also the case for emerging and developing regions (see Karacimen, 2014, for Turkey). 
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through central banks’ sterilisation operations (Gabor, 2010a, 2010b). In the context of 
South Africa, Isaacs (2014) argues that domestic macroeconomic policies have been 
shaped by and have importantly contributed to financialisation in the country. Particularly 
problematic are inflation targeting and fiscal restraint. Their combined effect is subdued 
domestic investment because public-sector capital expenditure is cut while private-sector 
companies willing to invest face prohibitively high interest rates. But high interest rates 
are necessary to attract short-term foreign capital to balance the country’s persistent trade 
deficit (Isaacs, 2014). South Africa shares this plight with other emerging economies that 
shy away from introducing capital account controls for short-term foreign inflows 
(McKenzie & Pons-Vignon, 2012). Illegal capital flight, arising from transfer pricing and 
other illicit practices among transnational NFCs, exacerbates the trade deficit, increasing 
the country’s dependence on foreign capital (Ashman et al., 2011b).  
There is a strong international dimension to financialisation, most visible in cross-
border capital flows (Stockhammer, 2013). In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, poor 
countries became increasingly integrated into global financial structures, opening up their 
capital accounts to foreign financial inflows (Abiad et al., 2008). Efforts by the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to promote the Washington Consensus, a policy 
mix of fiscal restraint, deregulation, privatisation, and liberalisation of trade and finance 
(Williamson, 1990), were instrumental in this development. Therefore, some argue that 
financialisation in developing and emerging regions is mainly driven externally through 
financial liberalisation (Lapavitsas, 2009). Financial flows from rich to poor countries 
increased markedly during the 1990s, surging in the 2000s (Schmuckler, 2004; 
Aizenman, Jinjarak & Park 2011; Nier, Sedik & Mondino 2014). It has been argued that 
intensifying financialisation dynamics in rich countries drove the financial flows into poor 
countries during the boom years of the early 2000s (Tyson & McKinley, 2014). Loose 
monetary policy introduced in response to the global financial crisis of 2007-8 in rich 
economies has pushed financial investment flows towards emerging markets as interest 
rate differentials between poor and rich countries have further increased (Akyüz, 2015).  
As South Africa re-integrated into the global economy the country went from being 
a net lender to becoming a net borrower from the rest of the world (Newman, 2015). Thus, 
capital inflows into South Africa increased in line with the general trend observed for 
emerging economies. These inflows were largely short-term and therefore volatile. Thus, 
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they arguably drove financialisation in South Africa (Newman, 2015).4 However, external 
pressures (e.g. financial inflows or suggested macroeconomic reforms) are mediated by 
domestic dynamics, resulting in country-specific permutations of financialisation (Becker 
et al., 2010; see Rethel, 2010 for Malaysia’s example). Thus, the South African 
experience does not exemplify a ‘standard’ financialisation story in the global South since 
in fact that standard story does not exist. However, in comparison to other emerging 
economies South Africa has been affected relatively strongly by financialisation across 
the different macroeconomic sectors (Karwowski & Stockhammer, 2017). More 
importantly maybe, like many countries in the global South the economy is strongly 
dependent on resource extraction while running a persistent trade deficit, financed 
through financial inflows. Hence, the South African case provides important policy lessons 
for other emerging economies.  
To shed light onto these lessons the article traces the way in which financialisation 
dynamics introduced through capital inflows play out domestically. It links NFCs’ cash 
and liquidity holdings, i.e. the current investment strike controversy, to the built-up of 
financial fragility through asset price inflation in the housing market. Housing bubbles and 
the realisation that homes and homeowners are financially exploitable are a major aspect 
of financialisation (Aalbers, 2008). Between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, South 
Africa experienced some of the strongest inflationary pressures in global housing 
markets. The country’s house price inflation was comparable to that seen in Ireland, 
where real prices for residential property almost tripled in that period (André, 2010). 
During South Africa’s strong growth period (2003-2007), real price gains were well above 
price increases in the UK and the US – two economies known for their buoyant housing 
markets (see figure 1).  
Figure 1. Real house price inflation in US, UK and South Africa, 2000-2017  
 
                                                 
4 These inflows coexisted with capital flight which might seem like a contradiction. Large inflows of portfolio 
investment can however occur together with capital flight since different types of capital – in the former 
case financial while in the letter case industrial capital – will drive the different phenomena.  
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Source: Absa House Price Index, Halifax Standardised Average House Price, S&P/Case-Schiller 
20 City Index, data sourced from BIS (2017). 
At its peak, in September 2004, annual house price growth in South Africa was 
33% in real terms. This housing bubble collapsed with the spread of the US subprime 
mortgage crisis to the rest of the world in 2008. Price deflation intensified during the 
ensuing economic recession of 2009, only stabilising in 2010. Real house prices have 
since been volatile. This is a serious socio-economic problem since the high and rising 
cost of residential real estate contributes to rising household indebtedness, while 
exacerbating wealth inequality.  
Financialisation is also at the root of another major socio-economic ill, currently 
stirring up anger in South Africa: the investment strike. With the end of apartheid a 
restructuring of domestic conglomerates began. Together with financial deregulation and 
liberalisation this was promised to deliver growth and employment. But private-sector 
investment rates hardly moved, only just reaching 1970s levels during the fast growth 
years of 2004-2008, while the unemployment rate remained stubbornly above 20% 
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(World Bank, 2017).5 Instead, many South African companies have held increasingly 
large sums of cash and liquid assets (Mbindwane, 2015; Karwowski, 2015), choosing not 
to invest. Consequently, domestic NFCs have been accused of ‘non-patriotic behaviour’ 
and of taking part in an investment strike (COSATU, 2016). To be clear the term does not 
refer to a slump in investment. It captures the frustration of the South African population 
who observe low levels of corporate investment activity not because NFCs are squeezed 
for funds but out of choice. The analysis presented here neither aims at explaining why 
businesses in South Africa hold on to liquid assets (for a firm-level analysis of this 
phenomenon see Karwowski & Mendes Loureiro, 2016) nor at exploring why private-
sector investment has been low and growth subdued (Eyraud, 2009). Instead, the article 
is interested in the macroeconomic impact of large cash deposits. 
As of February 2017, South African NFCs were accused of holding cash deposits 
worth R719 billion (Donnelley, 2017). This amounts to almost a fifth (17%) of the country’s 
GDP. Crucially, this figure only accounts for the short-term cash deposits of NFCs. The 
true extent of the investment strike is larger still since corporations do not merely hold on 
to short-term deposits if they want to remain liquid. For one, they can also entrust 
domestics banks with time deposits, i.e. receiving higher interest rates while pledging to 
keep the funds with the bank for a specified and longer time period. The total amount of 
corporate deposits has been therefore far larger (R1.8 trillion in 2016, see figure 2). 
However, corporations have many more options for liquidity management beyond bank 
deposits. It is more lucrative to invest into financial assets such as safe but low-yielding 
government bonds or more innovative – that is more risky – and high-yielding instruments 
such as foreign exchange derivatives, for example. These instruments can be a source 
of income beyond (and instead of) those companies’ productive operations and in a highly 
inflationary environment like the South African one a way to avoid losses when holding 
on to liquid assets.  
Figure 2. Deposits held with South African banks, 1995-2016 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that by the early 2000s commercialisation and privatisation of state-owned enterprises 
had been carried out in South Africa (Mostert, 2002). This resulted in a larger private sector, meaning a 
higher investment rate among private enterprises could be expected than in the 1970s.   
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Source: SARB, 1996a-2017a, SARB, 1996b-2017b. 
It has been argued that the volume of NFCs’ cash holdings is not excessive in 
historical perspective (Nyamgero, 2015); and that NFCs’ liquidity is not ‘idle’ cash since 
banks lend them out to other market participants (Keeton, 2018). However, it is not only 
the size of cash holdings that is relevant – abstracting from the fact that NFCs’ liquidity 
exceeds cash deposits with banks – but also how they circulate through the South African 
economy. The following analysis shows that corporate deposits facilitate mortgage 
extension and credit to real estate companies, further fuelling the housing bubble. Thus, 
this paper reveals the link between the financialisation of NFCs’ operations and house 
price inflation. In fact, the investment strike is a result of NFCs’ changing, i.e. increasingly 
financialised, behaviour. It is destabilising in two ways: First, it leads to subdued corporate 
investment, exacerbating domestic unemployment. Second, it contributes towards the 
build-up of financial fragility in the economy more broadly because it fuels house price 
inflation.   
Flow of funds analysis for South African NFCs 
To understand how money flows circulate in an economy the flow of funds are the 
best starting point. In fact, they are more suitable when assessing the effect of 
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financialisation on the economy than GDP or value added measures that are typically 
used, for instance, to show the size and growth of the financial sector (see Philippon, 
2007). The flow of funds data can provide insights into the interaction between real and 
financial transactions in an economy. Therefore, flow of funds analysis is increasingly 
used to study the extent and impact of financialisation (for South Africa, see Ashman et 
al., 2013; Newman, 2015). The ties between real and financial transactions are exposed 
through the treatment of macroeconomic aggregates as balance sheets that consist of 
interlinked assets and liabilities. This link becomes visible because individual sectors, 
NFCs in aggregate for example, are hardly ever able to balance their saving and 
investment activity for a given period. According to conventional economics assumptions, 
NFCs run deficits on their financial balances, investing more than they collectively save. 
This means that they run up liabilities by borrowing, for instance, from banks. NFCs’ 
liabilities, i.e. loans, are then banks’ assets.6  
Figure 3. Relationship between gross sources and gross uses of NFC funds 
 
Overall, gross sources and uses of funds for each macroeconomic aggregate, say 
NFCs, have to match up. If internal funds are insufficient to back companies’ planned new 
capital formation and desired liquidity levels (held in cash, equities, bonds etc.), NFCs will 
have to take up bank loans, issue bonds and equity or obtain trade credit from another 
sector to satisfy their funding needs (see figure 3). If they are unable to meet these needs 
through sources other than retained earnings companies will be forced to reduce their 
physical and/or financial investments. Once these transactions are considered in 
historical time, flows (e.g. NFC borrowing) turn into stocks (e.g. NFC debt). Selling off 
stocks of financial investment amassed in the past can boost internal funds while large 
                                                 
6 See (Green, 1992) for more detail on how flow of funds data is compiled and used.  
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debt burdens can drain these funds, requiring interest payments and ultimately principle 
repayment.  
Economic arguments about firms’ sources of funds traditionally focused on net 
positions (Corbett & Jenkinson, 1996, 1997). However, when sources and uses are netted 
out important information is lost. For instance, if NFCs acquired bank loans approximately 
equal to their cash and bank deposits their net position with banks would be close to zero. 
Whether both cash and bank deposits, on the one hand, and bank borrowing, on the other 
hand, were large or small would remain concealed from this analysis. Hence, this article 
analyses gross flows of funds between NFCs and the other four macroeconomic 
aggregates in the South African economy, i.e. general government, households and 
others, financial intermediaries and the foreign sector (SARB, 2011).7  
Two definitional details should be noted. First, ‘households and others’ refers to 
households in aggregate, but also picks up all remaining unclassified entities such as 
non-incorporated businesses or not-for-profit organisations (SARB, 2011c). Second, 
NFCs refer to private-sector non-financial companies. Flow of funds data also provides 
figures for state-owned enterprises. However, talking about an investment strike only 
makes sense with reference to private-sector corporations whose investment decisions 
are not under public control.  
South African enterprises have historically had a global orientation, rather than a 
primarily domestic one (see, for instance, Innes, 1984). This is reflected in the sectoral 
balances of private enterprises and the foreign sector (see figure 4). Whenever South 
African NFCs recorded a net financial deficit, i.e. their investment exceeded internal funds 
forcing them to borrow; the rest of the world was in surplus, becoming a lender to the 
South African economy as a whole. Between 1970 and the mid-1990s these two sectors 
moved reliably in tandem, with foreign inflows increasing when NFC balances 
deteriorated, and vice versa. Towards the end of the 1990s this close link appeared to be 
lost. But it re-emerged with greater strength around 2003. Thus, it seems that foreign 
inflows into the South African economy chiefly end up with private NFCs.  
Figure 4. Financial balances of NFCs and the foreign sector, 1970-2015 
                                                 
7 Since the 1980s the SARB has compiled flow of funds data, which is available going back to 
1970. For the methodology used see de Beer, Nhlapo & Nhleko, 2010. 
 13 
Source: SARB, 1994, SARB, 1995a-2016a. 
Analysing how NFCs fund their investment activity, i.e. the gross sources of funds, 
confirms this perception. Figure 5 shows the sources of funds that South African 
companies have used to finance their activity for the period 1970 to 2015. Non-financial 
businesses in aggregate are able to finance the vast majority of their gross capital 
investment internally. The external finance they acquire goes far beyond their productive 
investment needs, resulting in large volumes of financial investment. The top dashed line 
in the figure below, i.e. total gross sources, illustrates this. A ratio of available funds to 
capital investment exceeding 200% suggests that NFCs invested more into financial 
instruments than in productive equipment. Internal funds were particularly large in the 
mid-1980s, when South African NFCs could have financed 2.5 times as much investment 
as they chose to undertake. This, of course, was a symptom of the social and economic 
crisis under the apartheid regime, which coincided with the country’s debt crisis 
(Padayachee, 1991). NFCs abstained from investing, while also facing capital controls, 
which impeded outright capital flight. Amongst the external sources of funds, issuance of 
corporate paper (i.e. bonds and equities), followed by bank lending, have historically been 
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the most prominent (see table 1).8 Bond and equity issuance was especially strong in the 
1980s and 1990s. Importantly, when these two types of issuance are disaggregated it 
becomes clear that NFCs mostly use equities rather than bonds when turning to capital 
markets for funds.  
Figure 5. NFCs’ gross sources of funds as share of total investment, 1970-2015 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SARB, 1994, SARB, 1995a-2016a. 
This tendency is so distinct that resources generated through issued bonds never 
exceeded more than 20% of total investment expenditure since the 1970s, while new 
equity rose up to 120% of total investment spending, going well beyond financing needs 
for productive investment. This is in line with Toporowski’s (2000) concept of 
overcapitalisation. Overcapitalised NFCs use capital markets during boom time to obtain 
‘cheap’ funds since listed companies are not obliged to repurchase equity and capital 
gains on shares are materialised in secondary markets. During the boom years of the 
early 2000s, investment rates picked up because of the crowding in of private-sector 
                                                 
8 Figures in table 1 are broadly arranged by decade taking into account the institutional changes 
that came about with the end of the apartheid regime in 1994. The 2008 recession was also 
singled out since it constitutes a unique event. 
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capital spending generated by public infrastructure expenditure in preparation of the 
football World Cup in 2010. During this period banks gained in importance vis-à-vis capital 
markets as sources of funds for NFCs. Thus, the claim that South Africa shifted towards 
a more market-based financial system as result of its financialisation is difficult to 
maintain. 
With the recession of 2008 capital markets dried up and companies had to turn to 
domestic banks for external finance. This is not surprising since foreign investors are the 
main buyers of equity in South Africa. Since 1995 foreigners have bought on average 
40% of all issued shares, and are the group of buyers with the single largest volume of 
purchased equity followed by other financial institutions (30% of all shares), the latter 
including collective investment schemes (unit trusts and participation bond schemes), 
trust companies, finance companies and public financial enterprises that invest funds on 
behalf of their clients. Therefore, in 2008 the large outflows of foreign investment from 
South Africa contributed to the squeeze of local capital markets (McKenzie & Pons-
Vignon, 2012). 
Considering the current investment strike, it is notable that large volumes of 
financial investment by NFCs are not a recent development, but a historical trend. This 
explains why some authors argue that current levels of cash holdings are not unusually 
high (Nyamgero, 2015). The flow of funds analysis reveals that money flows circulate in 
the following way: While capital expenditure is to a vast majority financed internally, 
equities purchased mainly by foreign investors are the dominant source of external funds. 
Of course, private non-financial firms are not the only entities issuing ordinary shares 
through the JSE. Financial enterprises and public sector corporations are the two other 
major issuers. Nevertheless, private-sector non-financial firms issued the majority of all 
ordinary shares, accounting for more than 50% of the total stock in ordinary shares since 
1995. The crucial question now is what South African NFCs do with the funds they 
generate. What type of financial investment do they undertake?  
An answer must begin with the observation that there has been a substantial 
change in NFCs financial operations over the past two decades. During the 1970s and 
1980s, trade credit (provided by NFCs to other sectors) was the chief financial asset held 
by NFCs (table 1). A high proportion of their non-invested profits were directly channelled 
towards households and small non-incorporated, most likely informal, businesses. For 
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South African households credit obtained directly from NFCs most likely took the form of 
instalment sale and lease agreements or open accounts, which include all outstanding 
(and mostly short-term) debt to dealers (Prinsloo, 2002).    
Table 1. NFCs’ gross sources and gross uses of funds as share of capital formation 
In % 1970-1979 1980-1994 1995-1999 2000-2007 2008 2009-2015 
 Sources Uses Sources Uses Sources Uses Sources Uses Sources Uses Sources Uses 
Cash & bank deposits 96 17 156 19 105 38 72 45 62 2 112 15 
Bonds, equity & government 
paper 22 2 50 11 78 14 38 -4 14 35 53 0 
Long-term loans (non-bank) 23 1 32 0 45 1 37 0 66 0 18 0 
Trade credit 18 77 3 47 1 35 6 19 11 12 4 37 
Investment in life and 
retirement funds 7 0 -8 4 8 14 19 3 -17 13 5 6 
Other 19 2 3 4 -7 15 -17 15 3 -5 0 28 
Total gross 
sources/financial uses 186 99 235 81 230 102 155 75 138 45 193 79 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SARB, 1994; SARB, 1995a-2016a. 
Because of the systematic discrimination of non-whites, a particularly large share 
of black-owned businesses remained informal and non-licenced. This benefitted formal 
(mostly white-owned) businesses, which often subcontracted light manufacturing such as 
the production of clothing, furniture and metal goods to informal manufacturers, who were 
able to operate without adhering to minimum wage and work place regulations. One 
example documented in a survey on small-scale industry in Katlehong (situated east of 
Johannesburg) during the mid‑1980s is that of a small packaging firm, supplying the US
‑based multinational firm 3M. The owner of the small business, a previous 3M employee, 
was encouraged by 3M to set up his own business. Surveys undertaken in other 
townships (e.g. Orlando West in Johannesburg) suggest similar ties between informal 
and formal businesses (Rogerson, 1987). The interlocking of informal, often black‑
owned, small firms and established formal‑sector, typically white-owned, NFCs seems 
especially strong in the brewing and distilling sector in that period. South African 
Breweries used shabeens, informal bars mostly run by black South Africans, as 
distributional channels for their alcohol. Informal distributional links were important and 
lucrative, since informal vendors accounted for 40% of liquor sales in South Africa during 
the 1980s (Rogerson, 1987). Similarly, formal‑sector retailers and wholesalers enlisted 
informal hawkers to sell their produce (especially clothing and newspapers) (Rogerson, 
1989). 
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Thus, much of NFCs financial funds supported informal businesses and their 
productive activity as well as household consumption through trade credit. Over the 
course of the 1990s the role of trade credit diminished markedly with NFCs shifting 
towards highly liquid financial investment. Financial assets have since to a large extent 
been held in cash, short- and medium-term bank deposits, while other financial 
instruments also became a net outlet for NFCs’ funds.9 Total other financial assets were 
negligible in the 1970s. Subsequently, they grew somewhat during the 1980s and early 
1990s. But they only started to make up a substantial figure, measured as share of total 
gross capital formation of non-financial firms, by the late 1990s, when total other financial 
investment amounted to more than a quarter of NFCs’ productive investment. According 
to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) the position ‘other’ captures financially 
innovative, and therefore most likely highly liquid, operations (Monyela, 2012). This trend 
only halted during and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and is likely to re-
emerge. In 2014 and 2015, a sum equal to a quarter of NFCs’ total investment spending, 
was channelled into cash and bank deposits, implying that these extremely liquid assets 
are on the rise again.  
Why would NFCs favour liquid financial assets since the 1990s? Since similar 
trends have been observed in the US (Bates, Kahle & Stulz, 2009) and other countries 
(Iskandar-Datte & Jia, 2012) there is a large body of empirical literature, that mostly 
focuses on rich economies, dealing with firms’ liquidity preference motivated by 
precaution, the transaction motive, tax rebates or agency problems (see Karwowski, 2015 
for a critical discussion). Amongst some financialisation scholars the idea prevails that 
NFCs ‘switch’ to financial activity because their traditional core operations become less 
lucrative as profit rates decline (Brenner, 1998; Krippner 2005). Profit rates in South Africa 
differ strongly across sectors, averaging around 10% in manufacturing, 20% in service 
industries and more than 30% in agriculture and mining during the 2000s.10 There is little 
evidence to suggest that profit rates have fallen dramatically across sectors since the 
                                                 
9 Deposits with other financial institutions and the category ‘other financial assets’ have been 
grouped together. The average deposit held with other financial institutions over the period 1970-
2015 amounted to 0.7%. 
10 Profit rates refer to net operating surplus divided by input costs for the years 2000-2009. 
Disaggregated profit rates for manufacturing cover a large range from as little as 0.6% for textiles 
to more than 45% for tobacco production for the 2000s on average (Quantec, 2010). INET BFA 
provides sectoral data for listed companies, which is broadly in line with these estimates (INET 
BFA, 2013). 
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1980s (Quantec, 2010). In comparison, deposit interest rates in South African banks 
amounted to almost 15% in the second half of the 1990s and around 9% in the 2000s. 
Taking inflation into account real returns on bank deposits were more moderate, i.e. 
around 7% followed by a mere 3% for these two periods, respectively (World Bank, 2017). 
In fact, it has been argued elsewhere that high profit rates in oligopolistic industries are 
compatible with large volumes of liquid assets and that there is some evidence along 
these lines for South Africa (Karwowski, 2013). Thus, the question about the motivation 
of corporations holding large volumes of liquidity is difficult to answer and the response 
will vary by sector and company (see Karwowski & Mendes Loureiro, 2016). 
In an emerging market like South Africa it is important to note that foreign investors 
are some of the main buyers of NFCs’ shares. Thus, foreign financial inflows play a crucial 
role because they can make the issuance of equity attractive for listed NFCs in a rising 
market. The possibility that dynamics in domestic capital markets reverse unexpectedly, 
i.e. that foreign capital departs, make it necessary for these companies to hold on to large 
volumes of liquidity. Liquidity provides them with the flexibility to shrink their balance sheet 
– through debt pay-offs and share buybacks at any given time – and to acquire other 
companies and subsidiaries.  
Sources of external funds for South African NFCs are volatile (see McKenzie & 
Pons-Vignon, 2012). This is not surprising, as equity, for example, will mostly be issued 
when market conditions are advantageous to preserve the share price. Hence, what is 
needed to provide a more comprehensive picture of NFCs’ aggregate financial operations 
and their macroeconomic importance is an examination of stocks of financial assets, not 
just their flows. While the SARB is working on providing a comprehensive set of stock 
data for the South African economy (Monyela, 2012), figures on NFCs’ stocks of financial 
assets and liabilities are not currently available. In the absence of better data sources, 
the author has estimated NFCs’ financial stocks by deflating and summing up flow of 
funds data since 1995. In this way, we do not obtain the total volume of financial 
instruments held by NFCs but we can gain an idea about relative shares of different types 
of financial investment purchased. Hence, it is useful to express the estimations of 
financial stocks by type of financial instrument as a share of the total financial asset stock. 
Eight main categories of financial assets are identified (figure 6): (1) Cash and 
deposits, (2) interest in retirement and life funds, (3) other financial assets, (4) trade credit 
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and other short-term loans given by non-financial firms, (5) government securities, (6) 
long-term loans and mortgage loans, (7) amounts receivable and (8) bond and equity 
purchases. Cash and cash equivalents and long-term deposits have been grouped 
together, since these assets are all held with South African banks – that is, commercial 
banks, mutual banks, the Land Bank, and the Postbank. These assets tend to be very 
liquid, as they are either held in current accounts or in short-term and medium-term 
deposits with banks. Even long-term deposits, which have a maturity span of a year and 
more, can typically be resolved before the end of their maturity period, albeit for a fee.  
Figure 6. NFCs’ stocks of financial assets, 1995-2015 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SARB, 1996a-2016a. Note: The calculation is based on 
financial liabilities stocks measured in constant 2010 ZAR, using the GDP deflator (World Bank, 
2017) to obtain real values.  
Notably, NFCs have increased their cash and deposit holdings over the 1990s and 
early 2000s, from around 30% of total financial asset stock during the late 1990s, to 
almost half of total financial asset stock by 2005. Subsequently, a falling trend in cash 
and deposit holdings is visible in relative shares among types of financial investment. As 
cash and deposits were increasingly less favoured by NFCs as outlet of their financial 
investment the category ‘other financial assets’ alongside receivables gained ground. 
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While receivables most likely refer to outstanding balances with customers, other assets 
are probably highly liquid. Cash and deposits together with other assets accounted for 
more than half of NFCs’ financial investment when looking at the period 1995-2015.  
The absolute levels of NFCs’ liquid holdings remain vast. As shown in section II, 
total corporate deposits with banks were worth R1.8 trillion in 2016. These large cash 
holdings by NFCs have come under scrutiny with the investment strike debate. They 
might be on the fall in relative terms. Equally, they might not be at their historical peak. 
And, more generally, financial investment among South African corporations might have 
been larger in the past. Nevertheless, NFCs’ liquidity in South Africa is substantial and, 
more importantly, because of a change in their financial investment behaviour during the 
1990s (i.e. because of corporate financialisation) these liquid assets contribute to 
generating financial fragility through house price inflation as is shown in the next section.  
 
Financialisation and house price inflation in South Africa 
NFCs’ financial investment into cash and deposits ends up with South African 
banks, therefore we see the R1.8 trillion of NFC assets on banks’ balance sheets. In the 
mid-1990s, half of all deposits held in South African banks still came from households 
(figure 2), while only around one quarter belonged to NFCs, with the balance made up by 
deposits from financial institutions, public entities and foreign residents. According to 
conventional economics, households are the main savers in the economy, depositing 
their savings with banks, which then, in their role as financial intermediaries, lend those 
funds out to companies.   
Since 1995 corporate deposits have grown at a pace which far outstripped growth 
in household deposits in South Africa. As a consequence, by 1999 NFCs had taken over 
the position of major depositors from households, accounting for more than 50% of total 
deposited funds in South African banks by 2009. This share has fallen somewhat since, 
but nevertheless remains above 50% of total deposits. Hence, South African banks are 
not only the main destination for the liquidity held by NFCs, but equally, they are also the 
biggest depositor group with South African banks. The switching of roles between 
households and NFCs is a symptom of financialisation, with NFCs becoming major 
creditors while households run down savings and accumulate debt. As investment 
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spending by NFCs falters, debt-financed consumption and real estate expenditure of 
households become major drivers of growth in a finance-led accumulation regime 
(Stockhammer, 2008).      
Some economists argue that the investment strike is not a problem since banks’ 
balances are not ‘idle’ cash (Keeton, 2018). Hence, if large NFCs do not invest someone 
else in the economy will. The question arises what banks do with the substantial volume 
of liquid financial assets they receive from their corporate clients. On their balance sheets, 
these assets owned by NFCs turn into liabilities which – together with banks’ equity – are 
matched on the asset side. Banks in South Africa have not financialised in the same way 
their Anglo-Saxon counterparts did. While fee-income generating activities have become 
more important in the course of the 1990s, lending remains their main business (Teles, 
2014). In fact, even bank’s fee-based income is mostly linked to mundane transactions 
(e.g. administrative and transaction charges on deposits) rather than financially 
innovative instruments. In this sense, banks follow a more traditional business model. 
Thus, the majority of banks’ liabilities (85% in 2014) are customers’ deposits, while loans 
and advances make up their main assets (The Banking Association South Africa, 2014). 
Between 1995 and 2016, credit accounted for three quarters of banks’ total assets on 
average (SARB, 2017).11  
Within this asset group mortgage loans are the single biggest category which 
amounted to more than 50% of total lending at their peak in 2009 and 2010 (SARB, 2017). 
Mortgage extension made up more than half of banks’ outstanding credit. This share has 
since fallen due to subdued mortgage growth in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
In 2016, 42% of total loans and advances by South African banks were mortgage loans. 
During the boom years of the early 2000s, there has been an accelerated growth of 
mortgage volumes extended by South African banks (figure 7). Mortgage extension rose 
from around R130bn in 1995 to R850bn by 2007, almost doubling in size from 23% of 
GDP to 41% of GDP. In 2016, total outstanding mortgages were worth close to R1.3trn, 
having declined to 30% of GDP because of slower growth in new mortgages. The boom 
years coincide with particularly strong growth in deposits by NFCs. While corporate 
                                                 
11 Similarly, looking at the flow of funds data there is no significant change in the structure of 
banks assets and liabilities in the 1990s and 2000s except for a marked shift within loans and 
advances towards mortgage lending SARB (1995a-2010a). 
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deposit growth fluctuated between 1995 and 2007, on average, it was at a very high level, 
exceeding 20% per year. Markedly, this growth has fallen to just above 7% since 2008.  
Figure 7. Mortgage extension by South African banks, 1995-2016 
Source: SARB, 2017. 
In this situation corporate liquidity on banks’ balance sheets can facilitate credit creation. 
Crucially, this result depends on South Africa’s status as an emerging market. This paper 
does not argue that deposits create credit since in most countries money is endogenous, 
i.e. can be created by commercial banks through credit extension (Jakab & Kumhof, 
2015). However, financial institutions are time- and country‑specific, rather than generic, 
which is often implicitly assumed. As argued by Chick (1992) in her discussion of stages 
of banking evolution, for reserves not to be a constraint on credit creation at all, the central 
bank needs to accept full responsibility for financial stability. This goes hand-in-hand with 
a stable and low interest rate policy. Since there is no commitment of the SARB to a policy 
of low interest rates, interest rates have been relatively high (some would say ‘ridiculously’ 
so, Bond, 2005, p. 98) and, like in many emerging economies, driven by portfolio inflow 
considerations. This is especially the case since the mid-1990s when the country became 
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the IMF’s poster child of ‘prudent’ macroeconomic policies (Isaacs, 2014). 12 In fact, it has 
been argued that in emerging economies central banks’ ability to influence interest rates, 
i.e. to commit to low and stable rates, is severely limited by the international institutional 
setting in which they operate, being dependent on foreign currency for reserves 
(Lapavitsas & Saad-Filho, 2000). Socio-economic stability in the two countries that 
pioneered financialisation, the US and UK, are dependent on low interest rates to sustain 
domestic demand in the face of waning government spending (Crouch, 2009). In contrast, 
poorer countries with liberalised financial accounts are forced into a high-interest rate 
monetary regime (Bonizzi, 2017).  
Thus, commercial banks in emerging countries can be expected to engage more 
actively in deposit management with the aim to reduce their own borrowing from the 
central bank. A symptom of this was the steadily declining interest rate spread of 
commercial banks, meaning the difference between deposit and lending rates, in the 
course of the housing boom in South Africa. It fell from 5.2 to 3.5 percentage points 
between 2003 and 2008 as deposit interest rates increased from 6.6% to 11.6%. 
Nevertheless, the interest rate spread firmly remained one to two percentage points below 
the policy rate of the SARB. Thus, banks offered rising interest rates attracting more 
depositors, while never exceeding the policy rate above which deposit management 
would become too costly. Under these circumstances inflows of corporate deposits 
encouraged South African banks in extending large volumes of credit. Banks increased 
their share of mortgage loans in total loans between 1999 and 2010, channelling NFCs’ 
liquidity into the booming property markets. The inflationary process attracted increasing 
investment, further raising prices until mortgage extension stalled in 2008, and, in fact, 
contracted in real terms in 2009.  
 Over this period, mortgage loans were mostly home loans, which accounted for 
three quarters of total mortgages. The rest were commercial mortgages taken up by 
businesses. What about the other half of bank lending? What type of activities do South 
African banks mainly finance? Looking at the loan books for the big four banks, i.e. Absa, 
FirstRand (operating in South Africa as FNB), NedBank and Standards Bank, it is clear 
                                                 
12 For an in-depth analysis of the detrimental impact of high interest rates on South African growth 
see Isaacs (2014) who argues that high interest rates are in line with the interests of large South 
African corporations (for example when they transfer their listing abroad) and relatively low 
inflation encourages financialisation. Thus, inflation targeting and monetary policy more broadly 
support the interests of large non-financial companies, rather than those of local banks.  
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that their lending is conducive to financialisation processes. Figure 8 provides the shares 
in overall outstanding loans to the industries which are the main beneficiaries of bank 
credit from those four institutions. Absa, FirstRand, NedBank and Standards Bank are 
collectively sometimes referred to as the Big Four since they own the vast majority of 
banking assets in South Africa. In the early 2000s, these four owned three quarters of 
total banking assets in the country (Falkena et al., 2002). By 2014, they accounted for 
more than 80% of total banking assets (The Banking Association South Africa, 2014). 
Thus, their loan books are representative for South African credit extension in general. 
In recent years, the main recipients of credit in South Africa are households and 
the FIRE industry (i.e. finance, insurance and real estate services). They receive at least 
65% of credit issued by any of these four banks. Manufacturing, transport and the 
services industry together did not manage to obtain more than a fifth of provided loans. 
The rest is taken up by agriculture, mining, wholesale and the electricity sector. Thus, an 
overwhelming share of lending is channelled towards activities which are at the core of 
financialisation: housing purchases, debt-financed consumption and FIRE services. In 
fact, since the late 1990s lending to households (including both mortgages and 
consumption credit) and the FIRE industry has captured an ever-increasing share of 
banks’ loan books (figure 8). The average share of borrowing by these two sectors was 
a mere 16% in 1997, before climbing up to three quarters of total loans in 2008 and 
staying at a very high level until today (in 2016 it stood at 70%). As house price inflation 
has come to a halt with the 2008 recession banks have been less favourable towards 
households, especially in terms of mortgage extension. This accounts for the falling share 
of household credit in total loans. However, rather than shifting lending towards more 
productive sectors (such as manufacturing), credit now increasingly benefits the FIRE 
industry. Banks’ direction of lending remains supportive of financialisation processes.  
Figure 8. The big four banks’ lending (unweighted average) by sector, 1998-2016 
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Source: Annual reports by Absa, 2003-2016, First Rand, 2000-2016, Nedbank, 1998-2016, 
Standard Bank, 2002-2016. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has explored the processes of financialisation in the South African 
economy by tracing the sources and destinations of NFCs’ liquidity. The paper argues 
that rather than the volume of NFCs’ financial investment, the composition of financial 
assets is crucial to assess corporate financialisation in the country. While some authors 
(e.g. Nyamgero, 2015) claim that cash holdings of South African NFCs are not unusually 
high in historical perspective, this misses the point. Non-financial businesses in the 
country fundamentally transformed their investment behaviour during the 1990s, shifting 
from more productive uses such as trade credit towards highly liquid and potentially 
innovative (and therefore risky) financial investment. Following the direction of financial 
flows the article shows that – fuelled by foreign capital inflows – companies’ financial 
operations supported the price inflation in South African property markets. NFCs draw a 
substantial share of their liquid funds from abroad, issuing equity which is purchased by 
foreign investors. To counter their liabilities NFCs have been managing their liquidity 
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actively since the 1990s, holding between 40% and 60% of financial assets in highly liquid 
instruments.   
Most of NFCs’ liquidity ends up with domestic banks. During the 2000s, banks 
directly contributed to the build-up of financial fragility in South Africa by channelling this 
liquidity into the housing market through mortgage extension. While deposits do not 
create loans, the growth in corporate deposits on banks’ balance sheets facilitates this 
development in the global South. In contrast to rich countries, central banks in emerging 
economies (believe they) cannot commit to stable and low interest rates. ‘Prudent’ 
macroeconomic policies dictate that inflation expectations alongside foreign capital flows 
guide monetary policy, resulting in high interest rates. In such a situation, growing NFC 
deposits facilitate credit expansion. Crucially, commercial banks’ lending increasingly 
supports financialised activity. Thus, the investment strike is problematic because South 
African NFCs are unwilling to invest, while at the same time the handling of their financial 
assets contributes to financial fragility.     
In terms of financialisation theory, this means that certain financialisation 
processes in emerging economies will be distinct from those in rich countries. For 
instance, credit extension in Anglo-Saxon markets has been observed to be almost 
completely independent of banks’ liabilities and is rather guided by their considerations 
of market share and willingness to aggressively push loan creation. Therefore, NFCs’ 
cash holdings, which are also large in rich countries, do not influence banks’ credit 
creation. In fact, banks in rich economies such as the UK and US have diversified their 
assets away from loans and advances (dos Santos, 2009). In emerging economies, by 
contrast, where traditional deposit taking and credit lending activity is more prevalent 
among banks, liquidity held by NFCs can feed into credit booms. Corporate liquidity 
lowers banks’ cost of liquidity management, while encouraging the creation of lucrative 
loans on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets.    
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